Michigan Law Review
Volume 93

Issue 6

1995

On Humiliation
Jeremy Waldron
University of California, Berkeley

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, Law and Psychology Commons, and the Law and
Society Commons

Recommended Citation
Jeremy Waldron, On Humiliation, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1787 (1995).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol93/iss6/31

This Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

ON HUMILIATION
Jeremy Waldron*
HUMILIATION, AND OTHER ESSAYS ON HONOR, SOCIAL DISCOMFORT, AND VIOLENCE. By William Ian Miller. Ithaca: Cornell Uni-

versity Press. 1993. Pp. xii, 270. $25.
I

Though he teaches law at the University of Michigan, William
Miller is a historian specializing in the saga literature of medieval
Iceland. His earlier book was entitled Bloodtaking and Peacemaking: Feud, Law, and Society in Saga Iceland. 1 His new book,
Humiliation, is a discussion of the way in which the themes of the
saga literature bear on the world we study and inhabit as professors
and practitioners of law.
At first glance, the world of Bloodtaking and Peacemaking
seems radically different from the peaceful order of a modem lawgovemed society. The saga world is a world of violence and vengeance, insult and affront, envy and shame, status and gift: a world
in which Nordic heroes confront one another aggressively not only
in their warfare but also in their socializing, a world in which all
conversation "hover[s] on the edge of insult" (p. 85) and thus on
the edge of violence. It is a world in which life and limb are valued
in inverse proportion to dignity: a leg may be hacked off casually in
response to the slightest affront, and men who are exquisitely sensitive to others' opinions of them think nothing of killing another if
his opinion does not tally with their own.
Of course, no sooner does one say that saga Iceland differs in
these ways from our own world than one backs away from the observation, smiling foolishly. Is mayhem spurred by honor altogether unknown in the United States, one of the most violent
industrialized societies on earth? How else are we to explain the
fact that young men die in Los Angeles or New York for wearing
the wrong colors in the wrong street?. How else can we describe the
proliferation of drive-by shootings among gang members in an apparently unending cycle of affront and retaliation?
One of the aims of Professor Miller's new book is to show us
that we are not as distant from the honor-ridden culture of the me-
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dieval sagas as we might think. He does not, however, locate the
similarity between the saga world and modem America in the culture of drug dealers, Crips and Bloods, and assault weapons. Instead, he finds counterparts for Egil, a Viking warrior who seeks to
kill a man for offering him an excessively valuable gift (pp. 15-16),
and Gudrun, "who smiles and converses casually with the man who
wipes his bloody spear on her sash right after he has killed her husband" (p. 95), in the placid streets of Ann Arbor, among middleclass professionals, politely attending one another's cocktail parties
or reading groups. The dust jacket of Humiliation describes it as an
"unsettling look at how ancient codes of honor figure in the social
discomforts of everyday life." Those who do battle in Miller's contemporary sagas are pompous academics, fatuous sexual harassers,
professors trying to talk dirty in working class bars, the hapless
hosts of misbegotten dinner parties, and parents who have miscalculated the gift that their child should bring to another's birthday.
In short, Humiliation is a book about us, its probable readers people who, though living in a violent country in a violent century,
are perhaps least likely to think of themselves in those terms.2
II

Part of the reason for making this the comparison - rather than
using the drive-qy shootings, and so on -_ is that Miller is more
interested in the culture of honor; shame, and .humiliation than in
the specifically violent form in which that culture manifests itself in
the saga literature. The point of the book is not to show that we are
as violent, in our own way, as the Vikings were, but rather to show
that certain structures of interaction and meaning that are crucial to
an understanding of the way people spoke, thought, and acted in
the saga world also hold 'the key to much of the way in which we
speak, think, and act in polite society.
All the same, Miller is unwilling to let the issue of violence drop
entirely from his discussion. Chapter 1\vo of the book is called
"Getting a Fix on Violence" and raises familiar questions about the
definition of violence: Can an insult be violent? What about a
threat? Can violence exist in an omission as well as in the active
infliction of harm? Is the law violent? Is there a distinction between violence and (legitimate) force? His discussion of these issues adds little to the extensive literature on the subject,3 and I
2. Late in the book, Miller describes it as "the reflections of an academic on the psychology and sociology of certain social practices common to those who occupy comparable social
niches." P. 198.
3. See, e.g., JoHN HAruus, VIOLENCE AND REsP0Nsm1urr (1980); TED HoNDERICH, V1.
OLENCE FOR EQUALITY: INQUIRIES JN POUTICAL PHILOSOPHY (1967); LJ. MACFARLANE,
VIOLENCE AND nm STATE (1974); VIOLENCE, TERRORISM, AND JumCE (R.G. Frey & Christopher W. Morris eds., 1991); LAw's VIOLENCE (Austin Sarat & Thomas R. Kearns eds.,
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found this the least convincing chapter in the book; certainly it is a
distraction from the main line of analysis.
In his initial summary, Miller says that although violence is a
contested category, the contestation tends to be at the margins:
There is, he says, "an incontestable core to violence - when fist
meets face - that shades by degrees into more and more contestable claims of violence in which political and normative agendas
predominate" (pp. 7-8). Later, however, he describes the core of
the concept as "boundary-breaking" {p. 65) - the violent person is
one who violates boundaries - and he concedes that the boundaries whose breaking seems incontestably violent are themselves ambiguous and contestable {p. 60). If this is s_o, then the image of a
core of easy cases, "about which no sane person would dispute the
appropriateness of the interaction being labeled violent" {p. 59),
surrounded by a penumbra of hard cases will not do; contestation is
present at the core as well. Now, there is nothing wrong with the
idea of contestability-at-the-core, particularly for a concept that is,
as Miller rightly observes, as fraught with social and political significance as "violence." But the discussion would have been clearer if
the author had made explicit reference to the various models of
conceptual indeterminacy that philosophers and political theorists
have developed - persuasive definitions,4 open texture,5 essentially contested concepts,6 amo:µg others7 - as a framework for explicating the kinds of problems, that an analysis of violence involves.
Instead, the discuss.ion just meanders along, exploring 'what
Miller calls "the content of our intuitions about violence'; (p. 55):
violence is not the same as coercion (p. 64); not all pain is violent,
nor is all violence painful (pp. 66-.67); face-to-~ace encounters seem
more violent than the use of lethal ·technology from a distance
(p. 69); omissions can be cruel but not violent {p. 70); violent females are considered more deviant than violent males (p. 73); and
so on. There is nothing wrong with these musings, but they lead
nowhere; no framework is provided for assessing them, and so they
add little to the overall argument of the book.
The chapter is marred further by an pnhelpful preoccupation
with the issue of who decides - the victimizer, his victim, or the
observer - when the violence of some encounter is called into
1992); Robert Paul Wolff, Violence and the Law, in THE RuLE OF LAw 54 (Robert Paul Wolff
ed., 1971).
4. See C.L. Stevenson, Persuasive Definitions, 47 MIND (n.s.) 331 (1938).
5. Friedrich ·waismann, Verifiability, 19 PROCEEDINGS OF THE. AiusroTEUAN SOCIETY,
SUPPLEMENT {1945); see also H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 121-32 (1961).
6. W.B. Gallie, Essentially .C,ontested Concepts, 56 PRoCEEDINGs OF THE AiusroTEUAN
SOCIETY (n.s.) 167 {1955-1956).
7. See generally Jeremy Waldron, Vagueness in Law and Language: Some Philosophical
Issues, 82 CAL. L. REv. 509-40 (1994).
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question. Questions like "Who decides?" or "Whose perspective is
privileged?" are interesting only when something specific turns on
the characterization at issue, in other words only when somebody's
verdict - "This encounter was (or was not) violent" - is supposed
to have some particular effect in the world. Certainly, as Miller
points out, the concept of violence is linked to that of legitimacy
(p. 78): to call a forceful political action violent is usually to condemn it as illegitimate, while to call it nonviolent is to attempt to
surround it with some aura of Gandhi- or Martin Luther King-like
sanctity. Evidently, however, one and the same action can be condemned as illegitimate by some and commended as legitimate by
others; since the term "violence" clusters together a number of different characterizations and concerns, both sides may accurately be
drawing attention to important features. The question "Who de.:
cides?" is worth asking only if society as a whole needs to take a
stand on the issue so that some determinate consequence - a legal
consequence, for example, or a political consequence like official
willingness to enter into negotiations with a dissenting group - can
accrue. Only under such circumstances do we need to ask: "Whose
description is being accepted as society's characterization?"

III
Is our society more violent than medieval Iceland? Are the sagas of the American West more violent than those of the Nordic
heroes? We are constantly tempted, Miller says, to make such
cross-cultural or transhistorical comparisons:
[W]e seek to know whether it was better then or is better now,
whether the grass is greener on the other side or whether there is no
place like home. If answers to such questions are forthcoming, one of
the chief criteria informing them will have to do with the relative
quantity and quality of violence in th~ cultures . . . . [p. 7]

Miller believes this temptation should be resisted. Despite his
earlier talk of an "incontestable core" to the concept of violence "fist meets face," and so on - he concedes at the end of Chapter
Two that we simply do not have the conceptual equipment to enable us to make these comparisons. For not only are our own intuitions about violence "made up of inconsistent notions operating at
different conceptual levels" (p. 90), but also
the concepts embodied in our word violence may not have lexical
counterparts in the other culture[.] In other times the "violence problem" was not an easy conceptual dumping ground for everything
ranging from sport to child abuse. Old Norse had no word that ran
the semantic range of our violence. Nor for that matter does French
violence. Many core French uses of the term would seem metaphorical, tendentious, or vastly extended in English. [p. 91]
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On the other hand, if we were to retreat from the attempt to compare measurements of violence and to compare instead measurements of more easily operationalized phenomena like injury,
fighting, coercion, or fear, we would beg important questions about
why these, or some subset of them, are the appropriate dimensions
for comparison. Security from fear, and the absence or suppression
of physical combat may matter to us. But why should our concerns
be the touchstone when we ask which would have been the better
. society to live in? Why not instead, or at least also, ask: "What
would it be like for them - with their particular concerns - to
have to live in our society?"
To ask these questions is to see a deep~r problem with such
comparisons - deeper, that is, than the problems Miller points out.
Why exactly is it worth asking questions like those at the end of the
previous paragraph? What can possibly hang on our answer apart
from a meaningless kind of self-congratulation? I ask myself constantly whether the United States is a better place to live in than
New Zealand, for I might go back there some day. But for whom is
it a practical question whether medieval Iceland is a better place to
live in than the United States?
Here we come up against what Bernard Williams has called "the
relativism of distance":S
[I]t matters whether the contrast of our outlook with another is one
that makes a difference, whether a question has to be resolved about
what life is going to be lived by one group or the other....
. . . Many outlooks that human beings have had are not real options for us now. The life of a Bronze Age chief or a medieval samurai are not real options for us: there is no way of living them. This is
not to deny that reflection on those value systems might inspire some
thoughts relevant to modem life, but there is no way of taking on
those outlooks. Even utopian projects among a small band of enthusiasts could not reproduce that life.9
In this situation, evaluative judgments lose their practical content,
and their deployment becomes moot. This happens, too, with com-

plex concepts like "violence" that have a strong evaluative component; it happens whether the descriptive part of their meaning is
determinate or indeterminate, translatable or culture-specific, contested or incontestable. We might as well be relativists about these
comparisons. We might as well say that there is no right answer to
the question "Which society - Iceland or modem Ann Arbor - is

8. BERNARD W1u.IAMs, Ennes AND THE LIMrrs
9. Id. at 160-61.

oF PmLosoPHY

162 (1985).
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better or less violent?" meaning mainly that there is no intelligible
point to asking or attempting to answer the question.10
I should emphasize that this relativism applies only to the considerations canvassed in Miller's Chapter 1\vo. It does not make
the rest of his project inappropriate. We can often learn something
about ourselves from the study of some past or distant society, even
if the social form of that society is not comparable, for practical
purposes, to our own. The relativism of distance applies as much to
the comparison betweep. us and classical Athens as it does to the
comparison between us and medieval Iceland; yet no one denies
that we may learn many things by studying the politics and literature of ancient Greece. The dramas of Euripides, for instance, can
teach us much that we need to know about love, accident, anxiety,
vengeance, and degradation, and it can teach this to us even if we
do not put out our enemies' eyes with brooches or sacrifice their
children to our gods, and even though the social forms in which
these are intelligible actions are no longer real possibilities for us. 11
I think, then, that Miller is absolutely right to insist that even if
the violence of axe and spear is not for us the marker of when a
social encounter threatens somebody's sense of self, still we can
learn a lot by studying forms of interaction in another culture that
are marked in exactly this way, and by pondering whether those
forms have counterparts, marked in some other way, in the placid
interactions of modem everyday life with which we are more immediately familiar. "What I want readers to come away with," Miller
says at the end of the book, "is a sense of the social and psychological complexity of the most innocuous of our daily encounters"
(p. 204). He also wants us at least to entertain the hypothesis that
"the reason such simple interactions are fraught with danger" - or
with what counts for us as danger - "is that. we still feel the demands of something like honor very keenly" (p. 204). In this aim, I
believe, he succeeds.

10. Notice that the relativism of distance does not depend on the qualitative extent of
similarity and difference. A nineteenth-century Maori warrior may be much more like a
medieval Nordic hero than like a European CQ!onist farmer. Yet for the Maori warrior's
practical purposes, only the comparison with the latter is worth essaying: in the nineteenth
century, the Maori cannot be or become a Viking, so there is no point to his considering
whether the Viking. way of life js better or worse than his own, quite similar, way of life. Or,
to use another one of Williams's distinctions, the confrontation between two similars - the
Maori way of life and the Viking way of life - is purely "notional"; whereas the confrontation between the Maori' way of life and the quite different European colonist way of life is a
"real confrontation" that matters for purposes of choice and action. For "real" versus "notional" confrontation, see id. at 160.
11. The reviewer has the task of commenting on the contemporary relevance of Euripides' Hecuba at an American Conservatory Theater production in San Francisco this summer.
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IV

The title of the book provides the key to Miller's analysis. In
modem English, the word "humiliation" can refer to a feeling ("I
don't feel ashamed, I feel humiliated") or to an action ("He was
bugging me, so I decided to humiliate him"). Neither usage can be
understood, Miller argues, without grasping first that humiliation
h~s to do with a kind of social occurreµce: 12 a person's relation to
certain appearances that are key to his social identity, or that he has
tried to make key to his social identity, and the sudden collapse or
deflation of those appearances in the eyes of others whose acceptance of them is necessary, socially, for them to do their work.
Humiliation relates particularly to appearances regarded as appropriate to some ranked or valued social identity. As a professor
of law, one bears and presents oneself in a certain way among
those, such as one's students, who do not have that status; as a wellknown professor of law one would bear oneself in a slightly different way among other not-so-famous professors; as a law school
dean one bears oneself differently still; and so on. Appearance here
can mean anything from dress, demeanor, and vocabulary to styles
of greeting, degrees of familiarity, and observance of conventions
about the initiation, continuance, and conclusion of conversations.
Humiliation happens when some aspect of this self-presentation
slips, or when some real aspect of self is revealed that is at odds.or
in tension with the identity being presented.
One can be humiliated when one fails to maintain the appearance appropriate to the rank or role that ·one in fact occupies.
Much of Miller's discussion, however, relates not justto the slipping
of appearances, but to the deflation of pretension. "Humiliation,"
he says, "is the consequence of trying to live up to what we have no
right to" (p. 145; italics omitted). The' professor who behaves at an
academic conference as though he were a well-known scholar may
be humiliated when others fail to greet or recognize him (pp. 14951 ). Or someone who fancies himself to be sexually attractive may
be humiliated when a group of young women laugh as his path
crosses theirs (p. 139).
This sort of humiliation is the stuff of comedy; we delight in seeing through vanity or pretension, in imagining, from a safe distance,
the almost desperate way in which an imposter struggles. to maintain the appearance he has cultivated, and in seeing the effort come
to nothing as the pretension collapses in·a moment of unequivocal
deflation. Of course, the mirth is also part of the experienc·e of humiliation, for now the humiliated person is exposed not merely as
not the man he pretended to be (a famous scholar or a Don Juan),
12. Humiliation as "a social fact" is, in effect, "a quasi-juridical status." P. 196.
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and not merely as the man he pretended not to be (a little-known
scholar, or a man who is sexually inconspicuous), but as an imposter, a pretender, the butt of ridicule, someone who has made a
fool of himself (p. 144). That is the risk of pretension, the risk of
ending up in the eyes of others with a status much lower than the
status one found unsatisfying in the first place.
Miller believes that there is an important distinction between
humiliation and shame. 13 Humiliation has to do with the failure of
the presentation of one's claim to a certain status or identity. But
avoiding humiliation is only the beginning of the struggle for honorbased esteem. Honor is not only a matter of privilege; it is also a
matter of performing certain tasks, acknowledging certain duties,
observing certain limits, and living up to certain expectations.
Shame is the state that a person gets into14 when he fails to meet
these demands. Among warriors, for example, cowardice or the
failure to avenge a wrong done · to one's kin are occasions for
shame; among businessmen, bankruptcy might be the equivalent;
among us academics, the occasions for shame are things like plagiarism, too many rejection slips, or, increasingly, sexual harassment of
students.
I don't think Miller quite makes the case for a sharp differentiation between humiliation and shame, and 1 am not sure that he is
really committed to it. For one thing, he speculates that the division
of labor between shame and humiliation will tend to vary in part
with the extent of hierarchy in a particular society:
One of the necessary conditions ... .for eventually conceptualizing a
difference between shame and humiliation was social differentiation
and hierarchy sufficient to give rise to epidemics of hypocrisy and social climbing. The comedy of pretension could play only a very small
part in the heroic world because there was only one noteworthy
ground of pretension: pretending to be courageous when one was really a coward. In a differentiated and hierarchical society the possibility of pretension grows geometrically. [pp. 198-99]

His suggestion seems rather to be that humiliation and shame may
be different aspects of social discomfort rather than sharply discemable feelings or social situations. Still, he is right that we use the
words in somewhat different spirits. To talk of someone as having
been shamed, or as having acted shamefully, or to say that he ought
to be ashamed of himself, is never funny. Shame is usually occasioned by some serious breach, and it is in itself a dark and serious
· 13. See pp. 117-24 (describing shame).
14. I intend this phrase to be as ambiguous as it sounds. Like humiliation, shame is both
a social situation - "a status with an almost juridical aspect" (p. 134) - and a subjective
emotional experience. I will discuss Miller's treatment of the specifically emotional side of
these states in Part VII of this review.
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matter. Humiliation, by contrast, can be the subject of ribald comedy: think of Falstaff, for example, or Malvolio in Twelfth Night.
But, though Miller stresses the comedy of humiliation, he is
right to add that:
The delight we take in the discomfiture of the pompous can never be
one of simple mirth. There i& always a tinge of brutality in it, the
delight of kicking someone who is down, a delight we can indulge in
because the justice and desert of the humiliation excuses us from having to make excuses for .our failure of fellow-feeling. We can even
congratulate ourselves on the labor we devote to the administration
of such justice as a service to the coinmunity. [p. 149]

The book is dominated from the beginning by a disturbing story
Miller tells about his own participation in such an act of collective
brutality (pp. 1-5). He and a bunch of his colleagues decided to
humiliate a boorish and pretentious member of their reading group
by conspiring not to turn up at his house when it was his turn to
host the group's meeting. They called him an hour or two after the
appointed time to tell him they were watching a basketball game on
television at the house of another, more popular group member instead. This call ensured that he knew they were together and that
he would not be able to comfort himself with the thought that he
must have been mistaken about the date. It appears that the humiliated member never joined the group again.
,
Readers' reactions to this story, and the author's telling of it,
will vary, but I bet that mirth is not among them. The comedy
seemed forced even among the humiliators:
We made jokes about the situation, drawing the connection b~tween
our own actions and the kind of ostracism and social disciplining that
might have taken place in saga society.· And we laughed harder than
the jokes deserved. We constructed self-congratulatory justifications
for our behavior: we hyperintellectualize~ souls had shown ourselves
worthy of our subject matter and were wonderfully preindustrial in
the best Viking manner. [p. 3]

On reflection, Miller's main justification for participating in this action is that the boor had it coming to him. The man "was treated to
the rude truth that not only hospitality engenders obligations to reciprocate, but that offenses and assaults do too" (p. 5), even though
his offenses and assaults consisted only of general social incompetence and the "academically suicidal habit of lecturing to people
about their own subject matter on which he was usually woefully
misinformed" (p. 2).
If there is justice here, what are the norms that it vindicates?
Some of the norms are associated with the ranked or valued identities sustained in social interaction:
It is for the community to determine the social position to which you
justifiably belong. Your job is to know where they are likely to put
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you, based on both your knowledge of the relevant standards of judgment and how you stack up in relation to theni. And you will be
punished if you are unable to do so. [pp. 142-43; footnote omitted]

The pretentious person is punished, in effect, for failing to observe
norms that are remarkably similar to norms of honor - hardfought bases of distinction and ranking that are social in character
and thus not to be left to the whims of individual vanity or
pomposity.
Yet putting the matter in terms of individual transgression of
group norms15 may not quite get at the issue of honor. I hesitate to
lecture the author on something he knows more about than I do,
but I suspect that in saga society matters of social status are not in
fact securely upheld by group norms. On the contrary, the vindication of one's standing as a great warrior, or as a man to whom respect is due on some other ground, is largely left to the individual
himself: he must claim and enforce his due, and if he does not do it,
that may be a sign, so far as the group is concerned, that he is not
entitled to that status after all. Individual honor is therefore much
more precarious than talk of group norms suggests; it is much more
a matter of the individual's vigilance in sustaining his own status,
which explains the saga heroes' extraordinary prickliness and sensitivity to others' opinions, to their recognition, and to their affronts.
I do not mean that there is no social content to status or honor in
these circumstances: I cannot make myself a great warrior by forcefully presenting myself as such. Still part of what it takes socially to
be a great warrior is to be preoccupied with others' recognition. In
this regard, being a great warrior is not like being a Nobel Prize
winner - an objective matter of rank or achievement that anyone
can look up. It is more like being a "mover and shaker" in modem
politics - a status one can sustain only by behaving as though one
were a mover and shaker, a status that may be lost if one fails vigilantly to uphold it in the eyes of others.

v
It is a common observation that when we deal with one another
as equals, we deal with each other not as though distinction did not
matter, but as though we were all equally distinguished. To the extent we are an egalitarian society, to the extent that we accord people certain rights simply on the basis of their humanity, we are, as
Gregory Vlastos observed, "much more like a caste society (with a
15. "[H]umiliation can run across the closed boundaries of the honor group. In fact, humiliation is the emotional experience of being caught inappropriately crossing group boundaries into territory one has no business being in." P. 145.
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unique caste)" than like a society in which everything js based on
fine differentiations of merit.16
[T]he fact that first-class citizenship, having been made common, is no
longer a mark of distinction does not trivialize the privileges it entails.
It is the simple truth, not declamation, to speak of it, as I have done,
as a 'rank of dignity' in some ways comparable to that enjoyed by
hereditary nobilities of the past.17
If there is anything to this, we might expect issues of honor and
humiliation to present themselves not only as "an inherent consequence of ranked social difference" (p. 142), but also in relation to
the basic ranking - of ordinary membership - in any society.
Though Miller's main interest in the modem world focuses on the
petty pretensions and deflations of polite social interaction, he does
spend a perceptive page or two on what he calls "Humiliation with
a big H" (p. 165), the humiliation practiced by a torturer or a concentration camp guard.
The humiliation in that horrific world can still be subsumed within the
notion of pretension deflation which defines so much of comic humiliation. But the pretension being deflated in that upside-down sadistic
world is different. It is not the unmerited claim to a higher social
status in the moral and social world than one justifiably merits; rather
the claim of the torturer~ the concentration camp guard, the ideologies of ethnic, racial, and religious genocide, is that.the humanity of
their victims is a pretense. [p. 165]
Part of what the· torturer tells his victims is "that all social norms
are suspended-in dealings with them because they are not human"
(p. 167). But part of the enterprise, Miller says, is also to show that
despite the unambiguous validity of the victim's claim to human status, he can be made to behave in ways that are, at least superficially,
at odds with that status. There is a dreadful logic to this degradation: "[A] human who acts like a rat justifies his torture for two
contradictory reasons: because he disgraces his humanity by acting
like a rat and because as a rat he is pretending to humanity, a most
disgraceful and arrogant presumption for a rat" (p. 166).
What can the hell of torture tell us about the purgatory of everyday life? It can tell us that there are ways we fear we might be or
behave that might be difficult to reconcile, at the level of social appearances, with the dignity of O'Qr status as humans. An individual
pleading for mercy, an individual who has lost control of bodily
functions, or an individual from whose smell others recoil is still, in
principle, a human person with the rights and privileges attendant
to that status. But it matters intensely to people as a matter of very
basic self-esteem that they not be in these situations, and that may
16. Gregory Vlastos, Justice and Equality, in THEORIES OF RIGHTS 41, 54 (Jeremy Waldron ed., 1984).
17. Id.
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be a sign that the status of person carries connotations of some sort
of vague obligation to hold or bear oneself in a certain way appro. priate to the dignity of one's equal but noble rank. 18
It is also a sign, of course, that our commitment to equal dignity
is perhaps a little more contingent than conventional rhetoric suggests. Though we proclaim that first-class citizenship is at once crucial, universal, and inalienable, in fact the readers of Humiliation
are likely to acknowledge that the status that matters most to them
is respectable membership in their class or, less tendentiously, in
the circles in which they practice their profession, conduct their
business, and do their socializing. This membership defines what
we might regard as the normal baseline of honor for most of us; a
fall from this status would not be regarded as mere decline in rank
but as some sort of catastrophe. Specifically ranked social difference - organized around wealth, reputation, social or scholarly
prowess - is then built up from this baseline as a further structure
of honorific status. So when Miller observes that "[m]ost of our
disposition with regard to honor is defensive rather than offensive,
preserving rather than acquisitive" (p. 204), I take his suggestion to
be that baseline respectability matters for most of us much more
than competitive status.
Presumably something similar applies also to other classes or
strata. Those with whom one interacts socially sustain among themselves both a baseline of respectable group membership and a hierarchy of competitive achievement relative to that baseline.
Because basic status is thus stratified, Miller should be less embarrassed than he is about the general applicability of his observations. He remarks modestly at one point that the book comprises
"the reflections of an academic on the psychology and sociology of
certain social practices common to those who occupy comparable
social niches" (p. 198), and even more modestly at another point
that he is focusing "mainly on practices I am intimately familiar
with" and that the claims he is making "should be held to obtain
only for the narrow American academic or educated white communities I am immersed in" (p. 13). The narrowness of focus seems
fine to me, and it contributes of course to the sharpness of his analysis. There is no reason at all to think that his analogy between
saga Iceland and modem America has to work at the level of whole
societies. The world of the saga heros is a homogenous tightly knit
world of dense interaction; its appropriate analogue in America,
then, is not American society as a whole, but rather groups or strata
that are comparably homogenous or comparably tight-knit. One
18. See also the discussion in Jeremy Waldron, Homelessness and the Issue of Freedom, 39
UCLA L. REv. 295, 320-21 (1991) (discussing the relation between urination and human
dignity).
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might of course choose any group - urban black males, for example, or rural farmers -. and there would be a problem for Miller's
account if there were some such groups that knew nothing of status,
honor, and humiliation. But this brings us back to the basic point of
strategy I mentioned at the beginning of the review. By focusing on
the group whose members would be least likely to see their lives as
comparable to the violent, honor-ridden world of
saga heroes,
Miller takes on the hardest case, and therefore makes a promising
start on the wider enterprise of showing the place that honor occupies in social structure generally.
These considerations also help to explain the. methodology that
Miller uses. He writes:
·

the

What I am after is not hard and testable in the narrow empirical ways
of a certain style of social science. I credit feels, hunches, and my
method is largely the interpretation of what I consider to be recognizable situations involving the discomforts of norm violation and norm
adherence, the awkwardness of self-presentation in simple social interaction, and the pains of social and minor moral failure. [pp. 13334]
Nowhere. is this methodology better deployed than in Miller's

discussion of American middle-class conventions about hospitality
and gift-giving. His theme in that discussion is what he calls "the
dark, obliging, and importuning side of gifts" (pp. 5-6). Though
gifts advertise themselves as tokens of spontaneous goodwill, we all
know that the occasion and scale of gift-giving is governed by quite
strict social norms, and that this is connected to the-fact that giving
an appropriate gift is almost always the first move in a game of
reciprocity; it therefore operates in part as the creation of an obligation. To give another a gift at the very top end of the range of
acceptable scale or expense is thus something of an imposition, calling as it does for the other to reciprocate on a similar scale. If the
other would not have chosen to initiate an exchange at that level,
the gift will be resented as both a burden and a potential insult.
Miller's Nordic heroes killed each other over matters much less serious than this.
In modem polite society, we do not respond to gifts with threats
or violence. But we often feel them as annoyances just the same.
The gifts on which Miller focuses particularly are food and drink, in
the form of domestic hospitality: the dinner invitation. His account
of this institution and its attendant norms of reciprocity and obliga·
tion (pp. 25-35) is sharp and knowing, in a "Miss Manners" sort of
way. Much of it consists in a discussion of how one can avoid an
unwanted invitation, or, if one cannot avoid it, how one can avoid
having to reciprocate, or, if one cannot avoid that, how one can
avoid "the horror . . . of an eternal recurrence of gift and
countergift" (p. 29), all the while falling just short of humiliating
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either oneself or one's host. In these ·practices and conventions, in
their exceptions, and in the intricacy of the strategies involved in
avoiding both obligation and affront, we see the force of Miller's
observation that, although we do not kill each other like the saga
heroes, still, among us, "humiliation is a normal risk of normal interaction; it is an unavoidable feature ... of civilized emotional life"
(p. 206).
'
VI

So far, I have outlined what we might call the "objective" side of
Miller's analysis: humiliation and shame as social relations between
persons and norms. What about humiliation, the feeling? It is no
doubt possible as Miller says to be humiliated without feeling humiliated: "The incorrigibility of certain pompous souls is the proof of
the pudding" (p. 146). Admittedly the possibility is paradoxical:
there would be little point to establishing humiliation as a social
condition or predicament if those who suffered it were by and large
oblivious to the fact.
What is it to feel humiliated? What is the relation, exactly, between the social fact and the subjective experience? Leaving aside
the question of what occasions the humiliation, are there proper
and improper ways of feeling humiliated? Do these ways vary
across cultures? How does emotional vocabulary interact with feeling and culture? Is anger, for example, the same in all cultures?
What 9ifference. does it make to emotional life, when a culture begins to draw verbal distinctions between shame, embarrassment, and
humiliation? Some of the most interesting analysis in the book results from Miller's perseverance with questions like these, and his
refusal to succumb to a simplistic notion of feelings as purely personal, purely inner, or purely subjective. The refusal is dictated in
part by his starting point in Icelandic literature: "[T]he saga authors and saga characters do not especially like to indulge themselves in emotion talk" (p. 108). Reading the sagas, we are tempted
to think of the heroes, and their victims, as unfeeling brutes (p. 93),
for they respond to outrage or injury not, as we would, by garrulous
revelations of how it makes them feel, but by either action or talk
about action, supplemented occasionally with somatic descriptions,
given by the narrator, of blushing or pallor. Miller of course wants
to resist .the temptation, and so that leads him to raise searching
questions about what, if anything, an account of one's feelings adds
to an account of one's actions or· of what is expected of one.
Philosophical behaviorism seeks to identify mental states with
external behavior or dispositions to behavior.19 Miller is no beha19. The locus classicus is GILBERT RYLE, THE CoNCEPT OF MIND (1949); see also Luo.
WIG WmGENSTEIN, PHrr.osOPlilCAL INVESTIGATIONS (G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 1958).
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viorist,20 but he takes the connection between inner and outer seriously. enough to suggest that the feeling of humiliation might, in
large part, be the subjectively experienced readiness to respond to
the social fact of humiliation. If the socially appropriate response
to humiliation is to lash out at the humiliator, then one will feel the
combination of anger, fear, and excitement that usually accompanies aggression toward another. If humiliation tends to feed on itself, as one suffers not just the loss of pretended status, but the loss
of face that comes from exposure as· a pretender and the further
humiliation of being regarded as a figure of fun, then one would
expect fear to figure largely in the experience of humiliation.
These, however, are just intermediate explanations, raising further
questions about fear, anger, and other basic emotional states. Fear
of death might be a different kind of experience from fear of ridicule, not just the same experience, more or less intensely felt, in
response to a different stimulus. Fear, for a person whom the culture expects and permits to scream in response to certain threats,
may be different from fear for a person from whom a paralyzed
silence is expected (p. 99).
Above all, Miller is interested in the relation between feelings
and words. Notoriously, we use the single term "snow" to cover
many different kinds of precipitation that other cultures carefully
distinguish. Our emotional vocabulary may mark similar differences, Miller suggests.
·
The existence of the concept and term, say, of anger might cause us to
ignore the differences between closely related hostile feelings and·
lump them together.... They tend to make us subsume our emotional
states, or at least our understanding of our emotional states, into the
ready-made category the word provides. [p. 101]

Correspondingly, the late emergence of the English words "embarrassment" and "humiliation" may be a sign that people are in a
position to make finer and finer distinctions among the emotions
associated with honor.
Miller is not, however, ingenuous about the power of words
themselves in this regard. In a discussion of the English epic Sir
Gawain and the Green Knight (pp. 183-95), Miller notes that we are
presented with what is undoubtedly a distinction among shame, humiliation, and eml;>arrassment, even though our words for these
20. But he does use consciousness of body as a rich, expressive device for capturing emotion. Thus, for example:
'
·
· ·
'
With humiliation, the feeling may also lead to blushing_ and rising temperatµre, but
the center of feeling is the gut. The stomach goes queasy, the bowel contracts. One may
even feel the sudden urge to defecate which fear produces with the attendant efforts of
tightening in the bowel to prevent oneself from doing so. [pp. 160-61]
Once - just once - I would like to hear a description of that quality in response to the
typical television interviewer's question to the victim of some catastrophe: "How did you
feel?".
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emotions (or their equivalents) were not available: "It seems reasonable to assume that the richness of one's emotional life depends
to some extent on the richness of linguistic resources available for
the expression of emotions, yet language does not need a rich lexicon of specifically dedicated emotion terms to fund this richness"
(p. 195). What may be more important is the complexity and variation among norms, rituals, and responses associated with various
situations in social life, for in structuring behavior, these will necessarily structure conscious experience as well. Miller insists that we
must not lose sight of the fact that in some contexts, emotion terms
may serve mainly "as surrogates or shorthands for describing ritualized behavior or for making normative claims" (p. 101). We get a
slight sense of this from the way in which we can say that a bereaved person is "in mourning" whether he or she feels sad or not,
and Miller's suggestion is that something similar may be true also,
sometimes, of being angry, afraid, affronted, ashamed, and
humiliated.
VII

I said at the beginning that William Miller is a Professor of Law.
He has not attempted in this book to draw any heavy-handed connections between the honor world, whether in saga Iceland or polite Ann Arbor, and the legal world. Humiliation is a book about
the sort of people we are and the way we structure our interactions,
and of course that is something that any lawmaker will do well to
take into account. But Miller leaves it to others to draw on his
resources.
Beyond that, there is an occasional suggestion that the world of
honor and the way we behave therein is antagonistic to the world
that law purports to create. Modem institutions - law, state, and
economy - claim to have created a pacified society in which people are supposed to feel sufficiently secure not to have to take their
honor into their own hands, so to speak. Miller has his doubts
about this claim, noting that the modem state's emergence with a
Weberian monopoly on violence was violent in itself (pp. 81-82)
and moreover usually redounded to the benefit of violent aggressors and to the detriment of their victims. The rule against violence
was more likely to be enforced against aggrieved and identifiable
victims than against the unpredictable sociopaths who attacked
them.21 But whatever the merits of modernization, Miller thinks it
has left space enough for us to behave in premodem ways:
21. This point would have been clearer in Miller's presentation if he had represented Max
Weber's definition of the state more accurately in terms of "a monopoly of the legitimate use
of physical force" rather than "a monopoly on the means of violence." P. 80. See MAx
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[D]espite the claims of the law, the state, and certain religions, within
certain groupings we still live as if we were people of honor. True, not
all or even most of the roles we play function in the way the honor
game does, and it may be that even the roles we consider most important have very little to do with the mechanisms of honor. But it is
hard to get through a life without having a feel for some of the things
at stake in the world of honor, whether they be in the horrors of high
school, in the pressures of career, or in the simple exchange of gifts
and meals with family, friends, and workmates. Amazingly, in spite of
the reputed all-intrusive evil hegemony of modem institutions~ we still
manage to create spaces for ourselves within which we function rather
preindustrially for all that. And it is in these spaces that we often find
our deepest being engaged. [pp. 51-52; footnote omitted]

I wonder about this "preindustrial" thesis. We should recall that
one of Miller's hypotheses is that, although shame and humiliation
are both associated with the culture of honor, the specifically verbal
distinction between them emerged quite late, with extensive social
differentiation generating an epidemic of pretension and hypocrisy
(p. 199). It would be wrong to suggest that this hierarchy is
premodem or preindustrial; on the contrary, Miller claims that it is
saga society that lacks extensive differentiation (p. 199).
Alternatively, if one wanted to emphasize the decline of hierarchical status and the rise of modem equality, there would still be
the points discussed in Part VI above, that even equal status is disciplined by certain norms that function very like norms of honor.
Think of the importance, to our standing in the world, of having
"good credit" - that is, of not having slipped from the expectations
applied to the financial dealings of the ordinary Gitizen. It would
surely be naive to suggest that modem institutions disdain the aspects of honor and the potential for shame and humiliation associated with this status in favor of more legalistic forms such as an
action to recover a debt or the foreclosure of a mortgage. It is,
rather the legal remedy that seems exceptional in the modem
world; for the most part, society relies on the average person's intense fear of loss of status to enforce its economic order.
But this is just a quibble. Humiliation does not aspire to be a
work of legal theory, except in the very broadest sense that all social and literary reflection is relevant to the world with which law
purports to come to terms. On its own terms, Humiliation is a delight: It is a sly and challenging presentation or (re)presentation of
ourselves to ourselves.
At the beginning of the book, Miller observes that "we ... are
not strangers to the nervousness and tensions that necessarily accompany caring about what others think about us" (p. ix). Though
WEBER, Politics as a Vocation, in FROM MAx WEBER 77, 78 (H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills

eds., 1948).
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we are not strangers, we may not know the names of these discomforts; we need to be introduced. Miller has done a mannerly job of
effecting the introduction in a way that ensures that their names will
not be forgotten.

